The Baseline
North Dakota has 4,250 bridges. Of those, 470 are rated in poor condition, an 11% rate that ranks #8 nationally. The national average is 6.7%. (ARTBA 2025)
This is a small inventory compared to Iowa's 23,716 bridges or Pennsylvania's 23,314. Each poor bridge represents a larger share of the network, and each one matters more to the communities that depend on it. Over half the inventory, 2,281 bridges, sits on rural local roads, the largest functional category in the state. (ARTBA 2025; FHWA NBI)
Forty-three percent of all bridges in North Dakota exceed 50 years of age, past their initial design life. These structures were built for a farming economy with lighter loads and lower traffic volumes. They now serve an oil-producing state where heavy equipment, tanker trucks, and grain haulers share the same county roads. (FHWA NBI)
The geography adds strain. The Missouri River system drains the western half of the state, the Red River defines the eastern border, and between them, extensive coulee systems and glacial terrain create thousands of crossings across a state with fewer than 800,000 people spread over 70,700 square miles. (FHWA NBI)
The full state profile is available on ARTBA's North Dakota bridge report.
The Ownership Gap
The structural fact that explains the 11% rate is ownership. Of 4,250 bridges, roughly 1,100 are state-maintained and 3,100 are locally owned by counties, cities, and townships. That is a 27/73 split. (FHWA NBI)
The condition gap between those two categories is enormous. State-owned bridges have a structurally deficient rate of roughly 2%, while county and township bridges run at 14 to 18% and 21% carry posted weight limits. The $400+ million repair backlog sits almost entirely on the local network. (FHWA NBI; UGPTI)
The ownership math: Of 4,250 bridges, roughly 3,100 are locally owned. Local bridges run at 14 to 18% poor while state bridges run at 2%. Townships receive 13% of the County and Township Infrastructure Fund, $5.2 million of $40 million per biennium. The $400+ million repair backlog sits almost entirely on the local network. North Dakota's 11% statewide rate is almost entirely a local-bridge problem.
Township officers are legally responsible for their bridges but operate with the smallest share of infrastructure funding. This disparity is a recurring legislative tension, and counties with the largest local bridge inventories shoulder the heaviest burden. Grand Forks County alone has 284 locally owned bridges, the most of any county in the state. (FHWA NBI; ND Legislature)
What the Bakken Boom Did
The Bakken oil formation transformed western North Dakota starting around 2008. Production climbed rapidly, peaking at 1.22 million barrels per day in December 2014. The economic benefits were obvious. What happened to bridges was less visible but just as consequential. (ND DMR)
Statewide traffic increased 22% between 2010 and 2012, and in oil-producing counties it jumped 53%. The bridges carrying that traffic were built for farm loads on county roads, not for heavy oil field equipment and tanker trucks running 24-hour operations. (UGPTI; NDDOT)
The additional infrastructure cost was estimated at $350 million per year, and the statewide poor bridge count peaked at roughly 512 in 2014, during the height of the boom. (UGPTI)
Counties at the center of the oil play absorbed the worst of it. The pattern shows up clearly in the data.
| County / Category | % Poor | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ransom | 20.9% | Highest county poor rate |
| Billings | 20.7% | Core Bakken county |
| Dunn | 20.0% | Core Bakken county |
| Ward | 19.1% | Non-oil county, still high |
| Williams | 19.0% | Core Bakken county |
| Mountrail | 18.0% | Core Bakken county |
| Statewide | 11% | #8 nationally |
The worst counties cluster in oil country, but not exclusively. Ransom County, in the southeastern corner of the state far from any oil field, has the highest poor rate at 20.9%. Ward County, centered on Minot, has no significant oil production and still runs at 19.1%. The oil boom accelerated deterioration on the local network, but the underlying problem predates the Bakken. These were already old, underfunded bridges. (FHWA NBI; ARTBA 2025)
Where the Money Comes From
North Dakota's bridge funding picture is unusually complex because oil revenue is the primary driver. The oil and gas industry paid $3.3 billion in state taxes in 2024 and over $32 billion since 2008. Of that, $5.9 billion has been directed to communities and infrastructure. (ND Tax Department; ND Legislature)
The state's main infrastructure program, Operation Prairie Dog, originally set aside up to $250 million per biennium from oil and gas revenue. In 2025, the legislature passed SB 2012, cutting that allocation to $180 million per biennium, a 28% reduction. (ND Legislature)
Federal money has added a second stream: the IIJA Bridge Formula Program allocated $225 million to North Dakota over five years, and as of June 2025, $177.1 million had been committed toward 159 projects, a 78.6% commitment rate that places the state among the top 10 nationally. (FHWA; ARTBA 2025)
Other funding sources fill smaller gaps. The Flexible Transportation Fund distributed $119 million across 103 projects in 2025, though only about $6 million was earmarked for bridges, and the state fuel tax sits at $0.23 per gallon, unchanged for years. (NDDOT; ND Legislature)
The Upper Great Plains Transportation Institute (UGPTI) estimates $10.5 billion in local road and bridge needs over a 20-year period from 2024 to 2043, averaging $525 million annually. Current combined federal and state funding falls short by roughly $100 million per year. (UGPTI)
Despite having more infrastructure revenue per capita than almost any state, North Dakota cannot close the gap. The backlog grew faster than the money arrived.
The Flat Trend
The statewide poor bridge rate has been essentially flat since 2018. Using post-2018 numbers, where FHWA methodology is consistent, the trajectory is clear: roughly 10.7% in 2018, 10.7% in 2021, and 11% in 2024-2025. (ARTBA 2025; FHWA NBI)
The meaningful improvement happened earlier, between the 2015 peak of ~16% and the 2018 figure of ~10.7%. That decline likely reflects reduced oil traffic after the 2014-2015 price collapse and targeted repairs funded by early rounds of oil revenue allocation. (FHWA NBI)
Since 2018, despite IIJA implementation and significant state spending, the needle has barely moved. The poor bridge count dropped from 481 in 2021 to 470 now, a net improvement of 11 bridges in roughly three years. (ARTBA 2025)
Local bridges are the drag. The state highway system is in good shape at roughly 2% poor. Progress on local bridges is marginal because new bridges age into the poor category at nearly the same rate that others are repaired or replaced. The statewide rate will stay flat until local bridge funding reaches a different scale. (FHWA NBI)
What It Costs People
Weight-restricted and closed bridges force detours across a state where the next crossing can be many miles away. Twenty-one percent of local bridges are weight-posted, affecting school buses, emergency vehicles, farm equipment, and grain trucks alike. Specific bridges on ND 31 over the Cannonball River and ND 32 over the Wild Rice River are closed to heavy harvest traffic entirely. (NDDOT; FHWA NBI)
Deteriorated roads cost North Dakota motorists $313 million annually, $557 per driver, in additional vehicle operating costs from accelerated depreciation, increased repairs, fuel consumption, and tire wear. Traffic crashes cost $812 million in 2024, and the rural road fatality rate is nearly triple the rate on other roads in the state. (TRIP; NDDOT)
The economic stakes are substantial. North Dakota ships $199 billion in goods annually, heavily reliant on the road and bridge network. Agriculture contributes $41.3 billion in gross business volume, with nearly 90% of the state's land in farms, and oil and gas add another $48.7 billion. Both industries depend on bridge crossings that are weight-restricted or deteriorating. (BTS; NDDA; ND DMR)
The Northwood bridge collapse in July 2019 illustrates what happens when weight restrictions meet real-world traffic patterns. A bridge built in 1906, rated at 14 tons, collapsed when a GPS-routed semi crossed at 42 tons. The rebuild cost between $800,000 and $1 million, and while nobody was killed, the crossing was on a route that mapping software regularly directed heavy trucks onto regardless of the posted limit. (Grand Forks Herald)
The Rethink Question
Governor Kelly Armstrong, who took office in December 2024, has publicly stated that counties cannot repair every bridge, especially in rural areas. Armstrong told the Grand Forks Herald that North Dakota needs to rethink 21st-century infrastructure rather than replicate 1925 infrastructure patterns, noting the farming economy has shifted to an economy-of-scale model. (Grand Forks Herald)
This is a significant policy signal: no other governor in the top 15 states for bridge deficiency has publicly advocated for consolidation or abandonment of some rural bridges rather than universal replacement. (Grand Forks Herald)
The 2025 legislature moved in a similar direction. SB 2142 proposed an $86 million Township Road and Bridge Sustainability Fund, and HB 1065 changed the distribution formula from equal allocation to proportional allocation based on road miles, favoring counties with more infrastructure. (ND Legislature)
The legislative direction is toward triage, not universal coverage. Whether that approach can move the 11% rate depends on how aggressively the state funds local bridge replacements and how many bridges it decides not to replace at all. The math that produced the flat trend has not changed. Oil revenue is down from its peak, federal IIJA funds have a five-year horizon, and the $400+ million local backlog grows every year that bridges continue to age faster than they are fixed.
What "Poor Condition" Means
A bridge is classified as being in "poor condition" if any one of its three primary components (deck, superstructure, or substructure) receives a rating of 4 or below on the NBI's 0-to-9 scale. A poor rating does not mean a bridge is unsafe or at risk of collapse. It means the bridge has deteriorated to the point where it needs repair or replacement. Bridges rated poor are typically subject to increased inspection frequency, load restrictions, or both.
Data Sources
Statewide totals (4,250 bridges, 470 poor, 11%, rank #8) are from the ARTBA 2025 Bridge Report, based on 2025 FHWA National Bridge Inventory data. Ownership breakdowns, county-level data, and posting/closure figures are from the FHWA NBI dataset. Funding data is from NDDOT, the North Dakota Legislature, UGPTI, ARTBA, and FHWA as cited inline. The Northwood bridge collapse account is based on reporting by the Grand Forks Herald. Oil production and traffic data are from the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources and the Upper Great Plains Transportation Institute.
Trend Data Caveat
Post-2018 bridge condition numbers use consistent FHWA methodology. Pre-2018 figures, including the ~16% peak in 2015, are expressed as percentages rather than raw counts because methodology changes make direct count comparisons unreliable. The ~10.7% figure for 2018 and 2021 represents the approximate rate under the current methodology framework.
Caveats
Bridge inspection practices and rating standards can vary by inspector and agency. The NBI captures a snapshot in time; individual bridge conditions change between inspection cycles. Ownership splits (~1,100 state / ~3,100 local) and local bridge deficiency rates (14-18%) are approximate figures based on the most recent available data. Percentages are rounded to whole numbers except for the national average (6.7%), which is ARTBA's published figure, and county-level rates, which use one decimal as published.